I suspect the people Rufo et al call the radical left get some validation from that. It's a lot better than being called tepid whigs or dithering liberals. Not a lot of social cachet in them. But radical left? Something to savour, something bad ass, without any of the risks attendant on serious radicalism.
I really appreciate this analysis. I definitely agree that shared interests, or interests at odds, is a good stipulation for class—especially over mere income level. What about ownership and control over the means of production? I'm also wondering if it has to be an either/or? The New Left picked up a bunch of ideas from Marxism (like the revolutionary subject, conflict theory) but then did something else with those concepts, while nonetheless taking inspiration from figures like Lenin.
Good question. I don't think the ownership of the means of production is irrelevant as a domain of analysis, but my aim is to clarify what it is that compels a class to form consciousness, and in the present era ownership doesn't necessarily tell us all we need to know. Classic Marxist analysis identified the shared bourgeois interests as in conflict with the old aristocracy. The former wanted no agricultural tariffs so their workers could more cheaply feed themselves and they could in turn pay them less, whereas the latter wanted high tariffs because they earned their wealth from agriculture and couldn't compete with continental producers. The basic facts of the bourgeois owning factories and having to pay workers, and the threats posed by an alternative class interest helped consolidate their consciousness as a class, so in this case ownership is the crucial component of the class interest. But other scenarios also exist in which class interests are formed quite irrespective of questions of ownership of the means of production, so I try to adopt a more fluid conception of class to account for all these more novel scenarios.
Fascinating. To what extent do you think that the adoption of pure fiat currency in 1973 enabled all of this, as it appears to have allowed vast new opportunities for pillaging the national wealth. Do you regard that as irrelevant since the question is who is driving the car rather than how souped up it's gotten? Or did quantity exert a sort of qualitative effect on the class struggle? I don't see how this techno class would have gained so much power had the currency remained commodity-based.
The oil shocks and transition to fiat currency had an enormous impact. This could probably be an entire post, but to briefly summarize, the Arab states became fabulously wealthy after 1973. US grand strategists realized they needed to consolidate their relationship with the Gulf, as securing the region as a source of energy was key to economic stability and security planning. The idea of financializing the economy presented one possibility of such consolidation, because what it did - by promising the Gulf high returns on capital if they parked their oil surpluses in Wall st - was recoup all the additional funds the US was paying for energy after the 70s and using it to fund the credit boom of the 80s. So yes, the oil shocks were hugely influential on this transition.
The people Rufo wants so badly to be covert commies, I have long identified as "liberals with Che t-shirts": this goes for Brooklyn Marxists writing for Jacobin and The Nation as well as for "Queer Theory" mavens in bogus "Studies" departments all across contemporary academia.
There is no left left.
I loved Rufo's book. The argument is logical and solidly supported by references to texts. It is just so massively, hilariously wrong because reality is a different thing altogether from what language can do with it. In that sense, Rufo is absolutely one of the people he is attacking. Comedy gold.
I like this class analysis. I have tried arguing for years that before any kind of actual left can gain traction as liberalism folds in upon itself like a house of cards, we have to analyze the real conditions of class as they manifest in the present moment.
Starting with the PMC and its shifty positioning between Big Capital and Little Worker to gain more and more power in the system is fundamental.
I agree 💯. Rufo's book isn't bad as a work of social criticism (although I disagree with his politics and conclusions) but his Marxist framing is incoherent - perhaps consciously so - and seems more like a rhetorical strategy than an empirical account of institutional capture.
"Work and identity also become subtly bifurcated; the local butcher or parish priest is commonly identified through their vocation in a way that a local chemical engineer is not, because the latter’s relationship to labour is fundamentally different." The explanation is attractive but I'm not convinced. To the extent that people don't refer to "such-and-such the chemical engineer" in the US, it may be mainly (a) because an engineer wouldn't generally work with a neighbor as a client, (b) just a peculiarity of US culture; Germany would be in the other extreme (landladies insist on putting 'Dr.' on the doorbell of renters with doctorates).
I probably didn't explain it well enough, but that section is a highly abridged summary of a point C Wright Mills made in White Collar. He makes a much better case than I, in case you're interested.
Eric Kaufmann has criticized the standard rightwing narrative by tracing back wokeness to the people like the most famous member of the Old Right, H. L. Mencken:
I see the current ruling class as divided into two factions. One is the capitalist elite, which has been a component of the elite since the beginning of the nation. They are elites whose likelihoods are based on serving markets. The other are the mandarins, who arose after WW II. This latter group corresponds to your technical intelligentsia. They are educated *employees* (as opposed to entrepreneurs) whose livelihood comes from employment in entities serving a social support service not served by markets such as national defense, or healthcare.
Mandarins arose out of the growth in the size of the government , which arose out of real-world issues that come with economic growth. For example, the military-industrial complex reflected the emergence of the US as the hegemonic power. The fleet of national laboratories and medical institutions and the HIH, NSF and other agency grants to universities arose out of the role science and technology had played in WW II. As economic output grew to include ore quality-of-life things such as healthcare and environmental quality, we see government initiatives such as NIH and Medicare/Medicaid, EPA, OSHA, etc. All these initiatives employed educated workers, and spawned new industries staffed by educated people, who become the mandarins.
But the capitalists are still around. And there is much crossing between the two groups. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are both educated elites, who as a result of owning large successful firms fall into the capitalist elite category.
I'm an Oklahoman who still has his bus ticket in his back pocket. That is to say, your bag exceeds mine by a great margin with it's depth and diversity. I'm left to mostly enjoy the writing with this piece. It's a satisying read.
2020 found me trying to import a few volumes of Henriech Pesch's economic work. It ended up lost in customs. I likely wouldn't have derived much from German language books anyhow.
"For the gemeinschaft entrepreneur, all labour is personal and unalienated, whereas the stratified and impersonal nature of modern corporations leads the technical specialist towards an identity based on leisure."
This excerpt made me feel like I'd finally encountered some of what I sought then.
I suspect the people Rufo et al call the radical left get some validation from that. It's a lot better than being called tepid whigs or dithering liberals. Not a lot of social cachet in them. But radical left? Something to savour, something bad ass, without any of the risks attendant on serious radicalism.
I really appreciate this analysis. I definitely agree that shared interests, or interests at odds, is a good stipulation for class—especially over mere income level. What about ownership and control over the means of production? I'm also wondering if it has to be an either/or? The New Left picked up a bunch of ideas from Marxism (like the revolutionary subject, conflict theory) but then did something else with those concepts, while nonetheless taking inspiration from figures like Lenin.
Good question. I don't think the ownership of the means of production is irrelevant as a domain of analysis, but my aim is to clarify what it is that compels a class to form consciousness, and in the present era ownership doesn't necessarily tell us all we need to know. Classic Marxist analysis identified the shared bourgeois interests as in conflict with the old aristocracy. The former wanted no agricultural tariffs so their workers could more cheaply feed themselves and they could in turn pay them less, whereas the latter wanted high tariffs because they earned their wealth from agriculture and couldn't compete with continental producers. The basic facts of the bourgeois owning factories and having to pay workers, and the threats posed by an alternative class interest helped consolidate their consciousness as a class, so in this case ownership is the crucial component of the class interest. But other scenarios also exist in which class interests are formed quite irrespective of questions of ownership of the means of production, so I try to adopt a more fluid conception of class to account for all these more novel scenarios.
Fascinating. To what extent do you think that the adoption of pure fiat currency in 1973 enabled all of this, as it appears to have allowed vast new opportunities for pillaging the national wealth. Do you regard that as irrelevant since the question is who is driving the car rather than how souped up it's gotten? Or did quantity exert a sort of qualitative effect on the class struggle? I don't see how this techno class would have gained so much power had the currency remained commodity-based.
The oil shocks and transition to fiat currency had an enormous impact. This could probably be an entire post, but to briefly summarize, the Arab states became fabulously wealthy after 1973. US grand strategists realized they needed to consolidate their relationship with the Gulf, as securing the region as a source of energy was key to economic stability and security planning. The idea of financializing the economy presented one possibility of such consolidation, because what it did - by promising the Gulf high returns on capital if they parked their oil surpluses in Wall st - was recoup all the additional funds the US was paying for energy after the 70s and using it to fund the credit boom of the 80s. So yes, the oil shocks were hugely influential on this transition.
The people Rufo wants so badly to be covert commies, I have long identified as "liberals with Che t-shirts": this goes for Brooklyn Marxists writing for Jacobin and The Nation as well as for "Queer Theory" mavens in bogus "Studies" departments all across contemporary academia.
There is no left left.
I loved Rufo's book. The argument is logical and solidly supported by references to texts. It is just so massively, hilariously wrong because reality is a different thing altogether from what language can do with it. In that sense, Rufo is absolutely one of the people he is attacking. Comedy gold.
I like this class analysis. I have tried arguing for years that before any kind of actual left can gain traction as liberalism folds in upon itself like a house of cards, we have to analyze the real conditions of class as they manifest in the present moment.
Starting with the PMC and its shifty positioning between Big Capital and Little Worker to gain more and more power in the system is fundamental.
I agree 💯. Rufo's book isn't bad as a work of social criticism (although I disagree with his politics and conclusions) but his Marxist framing is incoherent - perhaps consciously so - and seems more like a rhetorical strategy than an empirical account of institutional capture.
"Work and identity also become subtly bifurcated; the local butcher or parish priest is commonly identified through their vocation in a way that a local chemical engineer is not, because the latter’s relationship to labour is fundamentally different." The explanation is attractive but I'm not convinced. To the extent that people don't refer to "such-and-such the chemical engineer" in the US, it may be mainly (a) because an engineer wouldn't generally work with a neighbor as a client, (b) just a peculiarity of US culture; Germany would be in the other extreme (landladies insist on putting 'Dr.' on the doorbell of renters with doctorates).
I probably didn't explain it well enough, but that section is a highly abridged summary of a point C Wright Mills made in White Collar. He makes a much better case than I, in case you're interested.
Nice take, reminds me of Gouldner in The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class.
Haven't read it , but definitely sounds up my alley
Eric Kaufmann has criticized the standard rightwing narrative by tracing back wokeness to the people like the most famous member of the Old Right, H. L. Mencken:
https://erickaufmann.substack.com/p/early-sources-of-woke
Thanks for the rec! Mencken as proto-woke sounds like an interesting take
I see the current ruling class as divided into two factions. One is the capitalist elite, which has been a component of the elite since the beginning of the nation. They are elites whose likelihoods are based on serving markets. The other are the mandarins, who arose after WW II. This latter group corresponds to your technical intelligentsia. They are educated *employees* (as opposed to entrepreneurs) whose livelihood comes from employment in entities serving a social support service not served by markets such as national defense, or healthcare.
Mandarins arose out of the growth in the size of the government , which arose out of real-world issues that come with economic growth. For example, the military-industrial complex reflected the emergence of the US as the hegemonic power. The fleet of national laboratories and medical institutions and the HIH, NSF and other agency grants to universities arose out of the role science and technology had played in WW II. As economic output grew to include ore quality-of-life things such as healthcare and environmental quality, we see government initiatives such as NIH and Medicare/Medicaid, EPA, OSHA, etc. All these initiatives employed educated workers, and spawned new industries staffed by educated people, who become the mandarins.
But the capitalists are still around. And there is much crossing between the two groups. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are both educated elites, who as a result of owning large successful firms fall into the capitalist elite category.
https://mikealexander.substack.com/p/the-mandarins-and-capitalists
I'm an Oklahoman who still has his bus ticket in his back pocket. That is to say, your bag exceeds mine by a great margin with it's depth and diversity. I'm left to mostly enjoy the writing with this piece. It's a satisying read.
2020 found me trying to import a few volumes of Henriech Pesch's economic work. It ended up lost in customs. I likely wouldn't have derived much from German language books anyhow.
"For the gemeinschaft entrepreneur, all labour is personal and unalienated, whereas the stratified and impersonal nature of modern corporations leads the technical specialist towards an identity based on leisure."
This excerpt made me feel like I'd finally encountered some of what I sought then.
Congrats on such good work.
Thanks man. That section borrowed heavily from White Collar by C. Wright Mills, if you're interested in this kind of analysis